

Calculus of Constructions vs. Coq (Syntax)

Calculus of Constructions

Coq

$\lambda x : A. M$

`fun x : A => M`

$\lambda x : A, y : B, z : B. M$

`fun (x : A) (y z : B) => M`

MN

`M N`

$A \rightarrow B$

`A -> B`

$\forall x : A. B$

`forall x : A, B`

$\forall x : A, y : B, z : B. C$

`forall (x : A) (y z : B), C`

$*$

`Prop/Set/Type`

\square

`Type`

A Tale of Two Universes

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`Set` is the universe of *sets*. We care about the distinction between inhabitants of a set. For instance, we care that 2 and 3 are different inhabitants of `nat`. We want to *compute* with sets.

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Coq's solution is to separate out the propositional universe (Prop) from the computable universe (Set). The two interact, but something in Set cannot depend on knowing the inhabitant of something in Prop.