

Calculus of Constructions vs. Coq (Syntax)

Calculus of Constructions

Coq

$\lambda x : A. M$

`fun x : A => M`

$\lambda x : A, y : B, z : B. M$

`fun (x : A) (y z : B) => M`

MN

`M N`

$A \rightarrow B$

`A -> B`

$\forall x : A. B$

`forall x : A, B`

$\forall x : A, y : B, z : B. C$

`forall (x : A) (y z : B), C`

$*$

`Prop/Set/Type`

\square

`Type`

A Tale of Two Universes

In CoC, all (basic) types have sort $*$ — the universe of types.
In Coq, there are two basic sorts: `Prop` and `Set`.

A Tale of Two Universes

In CoC, all (basic) types have sort `*` — the universe of types.
In Coq, there are two basic sorts: `Prop` and `Set`. Why?

A Tale of Two Universes

In CoC, all (basic) types have sort $*$ — the universe of types.

In Coq, there are two basic sorts: `Prop` and `Set`. Why?

`Prop` is the universe of *propositions*. We care *whether* a proposition holds, but not *how* it holds. We just want to know if a proposition is inhabited (provable), and generally don't care about which inhabitant (proof) we have.

A Tale of Two Universes

In CoC, all (basic) types have sort `*` — the universe of types.

In Coq, there are two basic sorts: `Prop` and `Set`. Why?

`Prop` is the universe of *propositions*. We care *whether* a proposition holds, but not *how* it holds. We just want to know if a proposition is inhabited (provable), and generally don't care about which inhabitant (proof) we have.

`Set` is the universe of *sets*. We care about the distinction between inhabitants of a set. For instance, we care that 2 and 3 are different inhabitants of `nat`. We want to *compute* with sets.

Example: Classical Logic

In classical logic, we have the axiom

$$\forall P : \text{Prop}. P \vee \neg P$$

Example: Classical Logic

In classical logic, we have the axiom

$$\forall P : \text{Prop}. P \vee \neg P$$

Intuitionistically, a proof of $P \vee Q$ tells you *which* of P or Q holds. Adding this axiom gives a new way of proving a disjunction where we don't actually know which of the two holds.

Example: Classical Logic

In classical logic, we have the axiom

$$\forall P : \text{Prop. } P \vee \neg P$$

Intuitionistically, a proof of $P \vee Q$ tells you *which* of P or Q holds. Adding this axiom gives a new way of proving a disjunction where we don't actually know which of the two holds.

Should this be the same as assuming the existence of a function that determines which of P or $\neg P$ holds?

Example: Classical Logic

In classical logic, we have the axiom

$$\forall P : \text{Prop}. P \vee \neg P$$

Intuitionistically, a proof of $P \vee Q$ tells you *which* of P or Q holds. Adding this axiom gives a new way of proving a disjunction where we don't actually know which of the two holds.

Should this be the same as assuming the existence of a function that determines which of P or $\neg P$ holds?

If so, then our functions go beyond computability. Let $H(n)$ be the proposition that the Turing machine represented by n halts. Then we have a function

$\forall n : \mathbf{nat}. H(n) \vee \neg H(n)$ which tells us whether or not an arbitrary TM halts.

Example: Classical Logic

In classical logic, we have the axiom

$$\forall P : \text{Prop}. P \vee \neg P$$

Intuitionistically, a proof of $P \vee Q$ tells you *which* of P or Q holds. Adding this axiom gives a new way of proving a disjunction where we don't actually know which of the two holds.

Should this be the same as assuming the existence of a function that determines which of P or $\neg P$ holds?

If so, then our functions go beyond computability. Let $H(n)$ be the proposition that the Turing machine represented by n halts. Then we have a function

$\forall n : \mathbf{nat}. H(n) \vee \neg H(n)$ which tells us whether or not an arbitrary TM halts.

Coq's solution is to separate out the propositional universe (`Prop`) from the computable universe (`Set`). The two interact, but something in `Set` cannot depend on knowing the inhabitant of something in `Prop`.